Groundlearn / Case studies / The gilt LDI crisis, 2022
The gilt LDI crisis, 2022
Leverage, collateral calls and funding liquidity risk
Pension hedges that worked, and could not be funded.
At a glance
| When | September to October 2022 |
|---|---|
| Who | UK defined benefit pension schemes using leveraged LDI funds |
| Instruments | Long-dated gilts, gilt repo and interest rate swaps |
| Loss | Forced gilt sales; Bank of England bought about £19bn of gilts |
| Risk type | Leverage, collateral calls and funding liquidity risk |
What happened
UK pension schemes hedge their long-dated liabilities with gilts, repo and swaps, usually with leverage so that a small pool of collateral supports a much larger hedge. After the government's mini-budget on 23 September 2022, long gilt yields jumped by more than a percentage point in days. The hedges lost value, collateral calls came due within days, and funds sold gilts to meet them, which pushed yields higher still. On 28 September the Bank of England stepped in with temporary gilt purchases to break the loop.
Why it went wrong
When yields rise a pension scheme's liabilities fall by more than its hedge, so its funding position improves. But the hedge settles in cash every day and the liabilities do not. Each call drained the collateral pool, refilling it meant selling gilts, and the selling moved yields up and triggered the next call. Because many schemes held the same position under the same rules, their individual sales added up to a market move. A solvency improvement became a liquidity emergency in about three working days.
What it teaches
A hedge and the thing it hedges rarely settle on the same timetable, and the gap is a funding need that nobody quotes. Leverage does not have to be speculative to be dangerous. Regulators now require LDI funds to hold collateral buffers sized for a yield move of around 250 basis points.
Key terms
- Liability-driven investment
- Investing to match the interest rate and inflation sensitivity of a scheme’s liabilities rather than to beat an index.
- Gilt repo
- Borrowing cash against gilts, the usual way an LDI fund obtains leveraged exposure.
- Collateral buffer
- The headroom a leveraged hedge holds so that a yield move produces a call it can meet without selling.
- Funding level
- A scheme’s assets against its liabilities — which improved through the crisis, even as its liquidity failed.
- Doom loop
- A self-reinforcing spiral where meeting a call requires selling the asset whose fall caused the call.
- Financial stability operation
- A central bank intervention aimed at restoring orderly markets rather than at setting monetary policy.
Where it sits in the course
Case studies like this one are used throughout risk management teaching, including FRM® preparation, as worked examples of leverage, collateral calls and funding liquidity risk. In OTC Learn the lesson runs in five steps: what happened, the position, why it broke, what it cost and what it teaches, followed by a worked example with the numbers. See the lesson outline.
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The instruments behind it
OTC Learn lessons on the products this case turns on:
- Interest Rate SwapTrade fixed for floating payments
- Collateral and the CSAThe cash and bonds that back an OTC exposure
Educational content only. Figures are from the public record, such as regulatory reports, commissioned reviews and court judgments, and estimates are described as such. This is not financial, investment, legal or regulatory advice.
Go deeper in OTC Learn
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